Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Claudia N. Case, individually, and as Trustee of the
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993, and as
Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999, Defendant/Appellant, v. Arnold
K. West and Mary Helen West, Plaintiffs/Appellees
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James \"Tucker\" Hansen; Hansen & Wright; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
Vincent C. Rampton; Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Case v. West, No. 20050315 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5733

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated
May 6, 1993, and as Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999,
Defendant/Appellant,

No. 20050315-CA

Vo.

ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,

Priority No. 15

Plaintiffs/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal From a Final Civil Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Judge Taylor, Case No. 990404457

James "Tucker" Hansen
HANSEN & WRIGHT
388 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: 801-224-2273
Fax:
801-224-2457
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

711499vl

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-521-3200
Fax:
801-328-0537
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
FILED
UTAH APPELLAE54G5QUR:

SEP 2 I 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated
May 6, 1993, and as Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999,
Defendant/Appellant,

No. 20050315-CA

1TQ.

ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,

Priority No. 15

Plaintiffs/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal From a Final Civil Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Judge Taylor, Case No. 990404457

James "Tucker" Hansen
HANSEN & WRIGHT
388 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: 801-224-2273
Fax:
801-224-2457
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

7U499vl

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-521-3200
Fax:
801-328-0537
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

14064.0001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

B.

POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUIETED TITLE TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IN APPELLEES
1
The Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Appellees'
Quiet Title Claim

1

Appellees Neither Claimed Nor Established a Right in the Subject
Property, Prior to the Court's Order of Summary Judgment,
Sufficient to Sustain a Quiet Title Claim
2
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM RULING, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT GEORGIA LAMAR WEST HAD
"WAIVED" APPELLEES' CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO PAY
TAXES

3

A-.

Appellant Presented the Trial Court, and This Court, With Sufficient
Information by Affidavit to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material
Fact Concerning the Alleged Waiver
4

B.

Appellees Received Ample "Written Notice" of Georgia Lamar
West's Intent to Declare Their Default

5

Appellant Was Not Required to "Marshal the Evidence" in
Challenging an Order Granting Summary Judgment

6

C.

711499vl

1

D.

Appellant Could Not Raise the Statute of Frauds as an Affirmative
Defense in Her Answer, as It Rebutted No Allegation in the
Complaint
8

E.

Appellees' Claimed Modification of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract Is Not Outside the Statute of Frauds

i

9

14064.0001

POINT III.

APPELLEES' FAILURE TO PERFORM THE UNIFORM REAL
ESTATE CONTRACT, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, MAY NOT BE
EXCUSED UNDER DEFENSES APPLICABLE TO THE
DOCTRINE OF "UNCLEAN HANDS"
10

POINT IV.

APPELLANT (IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE) WAS NOT A
PARTY TO THE 1987 AGREEMENT, AND SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR BREACH THEREOF
10

POINT V.

APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT

CONCLUSION

7H499vl

12
13

ii

14064.0001

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2002 Utah 4, 73 P.3d 315
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1996)
Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002)
Chen v. Stuart, 2004 Utah 82, 100 P.3d 1177
Kressler v. Peterson, 675 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984)
Miller v. Celebration Mining Company, 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001)
Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, 888 P.2d 659
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)
.
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P. 3d 332

4
9
4
6
3
7
11
3

Rules
Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P
Rule 7(E), Utah R. Civ. P
Rules of Judicial Administration 4-501(3)(C)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
Utah Code Ann, § 78-40-1

711499vl

Hi

7
12
12
2
1

14064.0001

Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999, by counsel and pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, submits the following Reply Brief in support of her appeal from the trial
court's orders entered in the above-entitled action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUIETED TITLE
TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN APPELLEES.

Appellees first take the position that they are invulnerable to challenge in having
persuaded the trial court to quiet title to a property in which they claimed no present
interest, since it was not properly preserved before the trial court, and was properly pled
in any case. This argument suffers two fatal flaws.
A,

TJie Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction of
Appellees' Quiet Title Claim.

First (and as noted in Appellant's opening Brief), a trial court's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a claim may be raised at any time during the proceeding. (See
Appellant's opening Brief at 3.) A quiet title claim is a statutory proceeding and remedy,
the elements of which are defined (and necessarily proscribed) at Utah Code Ann. § 7840-1, etseq. For those reasons more fully addressed at 19-20 of Appellant's opening
Brief, an action to quiet title must rest on a claim of title in property, not an attempt to
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wrest title from another. The cause of action is unavailable for such a purpose, and those
who invoke it as such seek a remedy not provided under the statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) confers upon the district courts of the state of Utah
"original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law" (Emphasis added.) Prosecution of a nonexistent cause of action - quieting title in property to which the claimant asserts no
ownership interest - is by definition an action "prohibited by law" by the very nature of
the limited cause of action conferred by the legislature. To brush such an error aside as
nothing more than a waivable irregularity in pleadings would be to ignore the limited
scope of the cause of action. Appellant's argument that the trial court exceeded the
limitations of its subject matter jurisdiction in quieting title to property neither owned nor
claimed by Appellees goes far beyond a simple 12(b)(6) motion which Appellant forgot
to make. It is, rather, the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause of action outside the scope
of what the legislature granted, and therefore prohibited by law.
B.

Appellees Neither Claimed Nor Established a Right in the
Subject Property, Prior to the Court's Order of Summary
Judgment, Sufficient to Sustain a Quiet Title Claim.

Appellees next claim that their cause of action before the trial court was, in fact, a
quiet title claim (even though they sought an order compelling the conveyance of the
property to them). The Court need go no further than the face of Appellees' Complaint to
see the fallacy in their reasoning.
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Appellees nowhere claimed before the trial court that the warranty deed held in
trust pending completion of the Uniform Real Estate Contract operated, without more, to
convey title to the Subject Property (as indeed, they cannot - a deed held in trust only is
not operable to convey an interest in property - see Kressler v. Peterson, 675 P. 2d 1193
(Utah 1984); Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P. 3d 332). Appellees' claim, rather, is
that Georgia Lamar West (and thereafter Appellant) was obliged, but had refused, to
convey title to the Subject Property in 1998, when Appellees made demand therefor.
Whether that refusal constituted breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (and if so, by
whom) was the subject matter of the claim, and of the court's orders on summary
judgment. As such, the quiet title claim was out of place, and should not have been
entertained.
POINT II.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD
HAVE PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM
RULING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT GEORGIA
LAMAR WEST HAD "WAIVED" APPELLEES'
CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO PAY TAXES.

Appellees offer a number of arguments in support of the trial court's conclusion
that, as a matter of law, Georgia Lamar West waived their contractual obligation to pay
taxes on the Subject Property. Yet in their own Brief, Appellees acknowledge that any
claim of contractual waiver is, by its nature, "extremely fact-sensitive" - Appellees' Brief
at p. 20. Appellant agrees. The lower court should have deferred to a finder of fact
following full presentation of the facts at trial.
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A.

Appellant Presented the Trial Court, and This Court, With Sufficient
Information by Affidavit to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material Fact
Concerning the Alleged Waiver.

Appellees first argue that they were entitled to the trial court's finding that Georgia
Lamar West "waived" their obligation to pay taxes under the contract, in that they
established a "prima facie case" of waiver, which Appellant thereafter failed to rebut. The
Court need go no further than the facts as summarized at pps. 25-26 of Appellant's
opening Brief to see the fallacy of this position.
Summary judgment is inappropriate where the opposing party presents facts
which, if construed in that party's favor, would preclude the requested relief. Ahlstrom v.
Salt Lake City Corporation, 2002 Utah 4, 73 P.3d 315; Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63
P.3d 721 (Utah 2002). In her submittals to the trial court, Appellant established both
words and conduct from Georgia Lamar West completely inconsistent with the required
intent to relinquish a known right - statements to Appellant that Appellees were failing to
pay the taxes (R. 0666); conveyances of Georgia Lamar West's interest in the Property to
the trusts, in derogation of Appellee's claims (R. 0015); and her refusal to convey the
Property to Appellees upon demand, even when they claimed to have performed under the
contract {Id.). No amount of re-characterization on Appellees' behalf can erase the
existence of a judicable controversy over whether, under a totality of circumstances,
Georgia Lamar West did or did not intend to rewrite the 1987 Agreement to impose upon
herself (rather than Appellees) the obligation to pay taxes while they were occupying the
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Subject Property, and otherwise performing according to the terms of the Agreement.
Appellant was clearly entitled to trial on this issue.
B.

Appellees Received Ample "Written Notice" of Georgia Lamar
West's Intent to Declare Their Default.

While they do not urge the point as a defense in the "Argument" section of their
Brief, Appellees make passing reference in their "Statement of Facts" to the 1987
agreement's requirement that a default be preceded by "written notice". The contract is
silent, though, as to when the written notice must issue, who must send it, to what
individual or address it must be sent, or what it must contain.
Appellees have received an abundance of "written notice" that Georgia Lamar
West did not intend to convey the Subject Property to them due to their failure to pay
taxes thereon - from the notice received from the Utah County Recorder's Office upon
their attempt to-record the Warranty Deed in 1998 that the Property had been conveyed to
the trust, to pleadings, moving papers, and correspondence of counsel, to the responsive
pleadings in this action. The purpose of any written notice provision in an agreement is to
put the affected party on notice of the other party's intentions. Appellees can hardly
claim ignorance in this regard (as the trial court apparently believed - none of the
decisions of the trial court from which this appeal is taken addressed the notice issue in
anyway).
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G.

Appellant Was Not Required to "Marshal the Evidence" in
Challenging an Order Granting Summary Judgment.

At pps. 19-20 of their Brief, Appellees make the singular argument that Appellant
may not challenge the lower court's Order Granting Summary Judgment on the question
whether Georgia Lamar West waived her right under the real estate contract at issue in
this action, because she has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support of the lower
court's ruling. Appellees cite the Court to Chen v. Stuart, 2004 Utah 82, 100 P.3d 1177,
and cases cited therein.
To begin with, there was no trial in this matter. The Court entered summary
judgment on the basis of Appellees' Affidavits, which have been made a part of the
record herein, and cited to in Appellants' opening Brief. Pages 20-27 of Appellant's
opening Brief discussed the reasons why the Affidavits should not have precluded the
existence of genuine issues of material fact, defeating summary judgment. With no trial
record, Appellees' vague demand that there be more "marshalling" of evidence than this
is a mystery.
More fundamental, though, is the fact that Appellees' argument completely
misapprehends the standard of review applicable to orders granting summary judgment.
The Chen decision addressed findings of fact made by the trial court following a non-jury
trial, which the appellate court reviews under a "clearly erroneous" standard:
A trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .. . in
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous,
fajn appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
711499vl
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then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trail court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence"
(Citing Estate o/Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).
2004 Utah 82 at U 19 (emphasis added).
An order granting summary judgment, by contrast, is not reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard, as it does not entail a weighing or sifting of evidence. It
presupposes that there is no genuine issue of material fact. This Court affords the trial
court no deference whatever in the making of this determination; rather, it presumes all
factual questions against the movant, and reviews the trial court's legal determination de
novo for correctness (see cases cited under subpoint A, above). Only if the trial court's
application of the correct law to all facts viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party still justifies the entry of summary judgment will be trial court's ruling be
sustained. See generally Miller v. Celebration Mining Company, 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah
2001).
To demonstrate the trial court's error in granting summary judgment herein,
Appellant was required only to present evidence by affidavit sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P. For those reasons set out above and in her
opening Brief, Appellant submits that she has clearly done so. She is not required to
marshal evidence supporting the trial court's "findings", and then overcome any
presumption created by the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
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D.

Appellant Could Not Raise the Statute of Frauds as an
Affirmative Defense in Her Answer, as It Rebutted No
Allegation in the Complaint

In response to Appellant's argument that the transfer of tax payment obligations
from Appellees to Georgia Lamar West was a modification of the 1987 agreement which
needed to be in writing, Appellees point out that the Utah Statute of Frauds was not pled
as an affirmative defense in Appellant's Answer (Appellees' Brief at 20-21).
It is true that a defense based upon the statute of frauds is by definition an
"affirmative defense" which must be pled in response to a claim. The difficulty here,
though, is that that statute of frauds did not directly address any of the operative
allegations of the Complaint. Nowhere in their Complaint did Appellees make the
assertion that, even though they had failed to pay the taxes on the Subject Property,
Georgia Lamar West had excused that performance by an express waiver or novation of
contract. Appellees allege, rather, that they had performed in full under the contract - an
allegation which Appellant denied. (Complaint, R. 0015 at ^ 10; Answer, R. 0024, at
U 9.) Only during the course of motion practice (which resulted in the Order Granting
Partial Summary Judgment in Appellees' favor) did Appellees admit that they paid no
taxes, but claimed that Georgia Lamar West had excused their performance in this regard
through an express novation or waiver. As such, Appellant's failure to raise the statute of
frauds as an affirmative defense cannot be deemed a waiver of that defense in face of
later-asserted claims.
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E.

Appellees' Claimed Modification of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract Is Not Outside the Statute of Frauds.

Appellees argue, at pps. 21-22 of their Brief, that their alleged verbal agreement
with Georgia Lamar West, under which she assumed the obligation to pay taxes on the
Subject Property on Appellees' behalf, falls outside the statute of frauds because they
have "changed position by performing an oral modification" (citing Allen v. Kingdon, 723
P.2d 394 (Utah 1996), as well as cases invoking the doctrine of "part performance").
Appellees fail, however, to articulate any change in their position which would
render inequitable the enforcement of the contract as originally framed. It is Appellees'
position that Georgia Lamar West knowingly and voluntarily paid taxes on their behalf,
while letting them continue in occupancy of the Subject Property, as a result of a verbal
understanding. As such, the only "change of position" to which Appellees can point is
that they have/not paid the taxes, or reimbursed anyone for having done so on their
behalf. The doctrine of part performance calls for some significant change of position in
reliance upon a promise, such that the party invoking the doctrine would suffer injury
through imposition of the statute of frauds. The only injury which Appellees would incur
would be the necessity of performing as per their agreement, and reimbursing the estate of
Georgia Lamar West for taxes paid. The doctrine of part performance has no application
under these circumstances.
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POINT III. APPELLEES'FAILURE TO PERFORM THE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, AS A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SEEKING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, MAY NOT BE EXCUSED UNDER
DEFENSES APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF
"UNCLEAN HANDS",
At pps. 16-17 of their opposing Brief, Appellees argue that their failure to perform
the requirements of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract was excusable by the trial
court under the doctrine of "unclean hands," as there was no showing of bad faith
(Appellees' Brief at pps. 16-17). Appellees' argument, however, misapprehends the
requirements underlying specific performance.
For those reasons set out at pps. 21-23 of Appellant's opening Brief, a party
seeking specific performance must "do equity" by performing under the terms of the
contract. There is no requirement, under the governing case law, that failure to perform
be motivated by malice, bad faith or intent. By their own admissions, Appellees failed
outright to perform a material requirement of the real estate contract. Under the cases
cited in Appellant's opening Brief, this should have been fatal to their claim for specific
performance - whether their failure rose to the level of "unclean hands" or not.
POINT IV. APPELLANT (IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE) WAS
NOT A PARTY TO THE 1987 AGREEMENT, AND
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR
BREACH THEREOF.
Appellees' opposing Brief fails completely to dislodge the fundamental fact that
Appellant (whether individually or in her capacity as trustee of Georgia Lamar West's
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two trusts) was not party to the 1987 Agreement, and may not be held liable for any
breach thereof. The decision of Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company,
888 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) clearly established a distinction which neither the trial
court, nor Appellees' arguments on appeal, can overcome. Georgia Lamar West's quit
claim conveyance of her right, title and interest in and to the Subject Property did not
operate to convey, assign, or otherwise transfer any right or interest in the contract, but
only in the premises. See 888 P.2d at 663. Appellees' own argument, at pps. 22-23 of
their Brief, implicitly acknowledges that some transfer of the contract right - not the
premises - must occur in order to hold Appellant liable thereunder. By law, and
according to the Oquirrh decision, a quit claim deed simply does not rise to that level.
Appellees assert that Appellant's position, if accepted, would permit Georgia
Lamar West's estate to escape all liability under the contract. Quite the contrary Appellant acknowledged that, if the lower court properly found that Appellees were
contractually entitled to conveyance of the Subject Property, the Estate of Georgia Lamar
West is legally accountable therefor. Their contractual obligation, however, did not pass
to Appellant (or the trusts) by virtue of a single quit claim deed. So long as the Oquirrh
decision remains governing law, Appellant may not be found liable for breach of the 1987
Agreement.
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POINT V.

APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

Reduced to its essence, Appellees' argument concerning the trial court's failure to
afford Appellant oral argument before entering summary judgment is that, since
Appellant had failed to demonstrate, in her written submittals, the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact, the error was harmless. Were this Court to adopt such a standard,
the right to oral argument articulated at former Rules of Judicial Administration 4501(3)(C) (now subsumed under Rule 7(E), Utah R. Civ. P.) would become meaningless.
The prevailing party on a dispositive motion may always contend that oral argument
would not have affected the outcome. By the same token, the party against whom a ruling
is entered on written submittals cannot possibly articulate every circumstance which
might have arisen during oral argument, and affected the resulting decision. It is for this
very reason that the Rules expressly provide for oral argument on motions which may
dispose of all or part of a pending action, as a matter of right.
Appellees cite inapplicable case precedent concerning issues of a strictly legal
nature, and contend that by reason thereof, the trial court's denial of oral argument in this
case was not prejudicial. Yet by Appellees' own admission, the lower court's findings in
this case were "extremely fact-sensitive"- Appellees' Brief at p. 20. The trial court's
open disregard of factual issues and disputes in the entry of its ruling bear out the fact that
it simply failed to come to grips with this extreme fact sensitivity. It is self-evident that
oral argument could have improved the trial court's understanding in this regard.
7H499vl
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set out in her opening Brief, Appellant
submits that the trial court's entry of summary judgment herein was erroneous, and
should be reversed.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2005.

JONES WALDO HOLBRQOK & McDONOUGH, PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this 21 st day of September,
2005:

James "Tucker" Hansen
James "Tucker" Hansen, P.C.
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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